Rats & Whistleblowers: Barriers to Speaking Up
- bennym40
- Mar 16
- 6 min read
Updated: Mar 17
Whistleblowing is an extreme form of dissent. How organisations seek to disrupt, ignore and discredit whistleblowers provides insight into how organisations can (intentionally or unintentionally) limit dissent and challenge more generally.
“I’m not mad, I’m proud of you. You took your first pinch like a man and you learn two great things in your life. Look at me, never rat on your friends and always keep your mouth shut” Jimmy Conway, Goodfellas
The views and opinions expressed on this account are my own and do not reflect the official policy or position of my employer. Any content provided is for informational purposes only and should not be considered or relied upon as professional advice.
Omertà is the Mafia's strict, sacred code of silence and honour, demanding total non-cooperation with authorities, police, or outsiders. Loyalty to the group matters more than truth, justice, or even self‑preservation. Most organizations don’t operate quite such a rigid understanding of Omertà, or as brutal methods for breaking it. However, across all organisations, aligning with the group view is not just common, it is rational.
The rational case for keeping quiet
In a healthy organisation, the collective view is usually better informed than that of any individual. A dissenting opinion is more likely to reflect a gap in the individual’s understanding than a flaw in the group’s reasoning. Aligning with the group can lead to rewards like promotions and job security. Challenging the group can have the opposite effect:
Damaged relationships,
Career setbacks,
Reputational harm.
From a rational decision‑theory perspective, this makes sense: when knowledge is uncertain, the safest option is often to do nothing[i]. Change introduces execution risk, cost, and blame. Maintaining the status quo rarely does. Proposing change carries reputational risk for the individual, particularly if that change later fails. Status quo bias reinforces this dynamic. Most organisations do not punish people for failing to change existing processes. In fact, the more established a process is, the less likely anyone will be blamed for its failure.
When being right still gets you fired
I am reminded of a friend of mine who was working in investment banking in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis. His colleagues began to raise concerns about a property bubble. Those who acted on that belief - by diversifying their portfolios away from property or publicly challenging the dominant view - were fired. When the bubble eventually burst, no one was dismissed for their property investment decisions (even though many lost their jobs for other reasons).
Being early was worse than being wrong.
Keynes called this “reputation calculation” [ii]: where the reputational risk of dissent outweighs the cost of conformity, it is rational to align with the crowd. Deviate, and you risk being seen as reckless if you succeed, or foolish if you fail. Robert Shiller later argued that people can make objectively bad decisions while still acting rationally - because they are optimising for reputation, not economic outcomes.
Why only a minority speak up
Research shows only around 30% of employees speak up when they see problems[iii]. Two fears dominate.
Organisational inertia: the belief that nothing will change, and
In‑group backlash: Dissent challenges the silent majority’s worldview. If the dissent is wrong, the majority is vindicated. If it is right, the majority is implicated for having stayed silent. Either way, the dissenter becomes a threat.
Despite these fears, some people speak up because they care deeply about their role or organisation. Research consistently finds that whistleblowers are not disengaged troublemakers, but individuals with above‑average commitment to the organisation and its goals[iv].
What actually makes someone a whistleblower
We often think of whistleblowing as an act of dissent, but it is defined less by the act itself than by the organisation’s response. If concerns are addressed, the issue ends. If not, the person raising the concern may face retaliation and be labelled a whistleblower.[vi]
Who blows the whistle?
A UK study[vii] found that the “typical” whistleblower
Is a skilled professional with less than two years’ tenure,
Raises concerns about ongoing wrongdoing that has been occurring for less than six months.
Typically raises the issue only once or twice, and most likely to receive no response.
Retaliated against: junior staff are more likely to be ignored, and senior staff to be dismissed.
These findings align to our understandings of group identity and social licence. More senior staff are more likely to have sufficient social licence to have a legitimate dissenting opinion, and so must either be taken seriously by management or discredited, not ignored.
The role of group identity
The role of group identity in whistleblowing is complex, and unlikely to be a predictor of behaviour at an individual level. Each individual is likely to have a "work" identity related to their organisation, their team, and professional networks. They are also likely to have non-work identities, perhaps related to family, religious, political or sports groups. Group identity can impact likelihood of speaking up.
A study of whistleblowers in Malaysian education[iv] found that whistleblowing was less likely when the wrongdoer was closer to the person observing the wrongdoing, showing the potential for a negative effect from the “direct team” group identity. However a strong local support network can create a positive association with whistleblowing intention. A complimentary study [viii] of a different group of auditors found that strong internal group cohesion was found to reduce the likelihood of whistleblowing.
Organisational barriers to whistleblowing
The European Barometer on Corruption found that 81% of people didn't blow the whistle due to fear of retaliation[ix]. Even with legal protections, retaliation can take many forms:
Job termination,
Missed promotions or bonuses,
Defamation or public shaming,
Social isolation within the organisation,
Increased legal exposure where the organisations weaponises libel and defamation laws.
A University of Greenwich study of UK workers showed that, of the 40% of whistleblowers who received a management response, 33% received a formal reprisal at the first attempt, increasing to 39% at the second attempt, and 50% at the third attempt. Dismissal was the second most common response, with 24% of individuals dismissed after the first attempt, rising to 32% after the third attempt.
Joyce Rothschild, a researcher into the organisational response to whistleblowers, has found that “in the majority of cases [in her US-based research sample], the organisational managers against whom the whistleblowers level claims of wrongdoing seek quickly to discredit, defame and terminate them.”[x] She recounts one case where “the employer required the whistleblower to undergo a psychiatric examination conducted by a company-paid doctor”. The organisation is alleged to have used their leverage over the doctor to influence the outcome of the assessment.
Acts of retaliation against whistleblowers have more than a purely localised effect: they send a clear message to the wider organisation. Would-be dissenters are silenced or disenfranchised, choosing to leave the organisation rather than accepting the status quo. The “Overton Window” of dissent will likely become further constrained, as the very visible repercussions of whistleblowing force individuals to become more cautious in how they raise a dissenting opinion [The Overton Window, Social Capital & Risk Management].
How Risk Teams Should Respond To These Insights
Not all organisational dissent is as extreme as whistleblowing. However, Risk teams rely on employees to report issues. To encourage and monitor this:
Assess group dynamics: Teams with high seniority, tenure and cohesion may be less likely to raise concerns. Adapt methodology and frequency of risk reviews based on team profiles.
Interview employees with tenure of between 6 months and 2 years: Professional identity is more likely to outweigh team identity in the early months of employment. Interviewing new joiners of established teams is a good way of identifying potential risk issues.
Conduct risk-led exit interviews with staff: At the point of exiting an organisation, professional identity is more likely to outweigh team identity.
Monitor escalation: Track where issues are raised prior to risk issues crystallising, and whether dissent is minimised or ignored.
In the next post I will look at a case study to support this analysis: how 3M suppressed internal dissent over its manufacture and use of 'Forever Chemicals'.
I hope this blog sparks ideas and discussion. If you found it interesting, please share or connect with me on LinkedIn to contribute or provide feedback!
[i] Understanding Scientific Reasoning 5th Edition, 2006, Giere, Bickle, and Mauldin, 2006, 978-0155063266
[ii] The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: with The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Chapter 12, John Maynard Keynes, 978-1840227475
[iii] Driving Fear Out of the Workplace: Creating the High-Trust, High-Performance Organization, 1998, Kathleen D Ryan and Daniel K Oestrich, 978-0787939687
[iv] Nicholls AR, Fairs LRW, Toner J, Jones L, Mantis C, Barkoukis V, Perry JL, Micle AV, Theodorou NC, Shakhverdieva S, Stoicescu M, Vesic MV, Dikic N, Andjelkovic M, Grimau EG, Amigo JA, Schomöller A. Snitches Get Stitches and End Up in Ditches: A Systematic Review of the Factors Associated With Whistleblowing Intentions. Front Psychol. 2021 Oct 5;12:631538. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.631538. PMID: 34675830; PMCID: PMC8523783.
[v] Research: Whistleblowers Are a Sign of Healthy Companies, Harvard Business Review, 14/11/2018, Stephen Stubben and Kyle Welch
[vi] Joyce Rothschild, 'The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organisations' (2013)
[vii] Vandekerckhove, Wim , James, Cathy and West, Francesca (2013) Whistleblowing: the inside story - a study of the experiences of 1,000 whistleblowers. Project Report. Public Concern at Work, London, UK.
[viii] Philmore Alleyne, Roszaini Haniffa, Mohammad Hudaib, Does group cohesion moderate auditors’ whistleblowing intentions?, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Volume 34, 2019, Pages 69-90, ISSN 1061-9518, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2019.02.004.
[ix] Protecting whistle-blowersin the EU, European Comission, 2018
[x] Rothschild, J. (2013). The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(5), 886-901. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764012472400
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